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McMurray: Miscellaneous

MISCELLANEOUS
I.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

The Supreme Court of South Carolina issued four opinions
concerning misconduct by members of the bar. In In re
O'Shields,' the court adopted the recommendation of the Board
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline2 that the respondent O'Shields be disbarred for unspecified misconduct.
An attorney who misappropriated funds by "forging or causing to be forged" his clients' signatures on checks was disbarred
in In re Merritt.: Disbarment was ordered despite the subsequent
restoration of the misappropriated funds.
In In re Mixson' the court was faced with more serious challenges to the Board's findings and recommendations. The respondent was charged with two instances of misconduct which the
Board thought tended to "pollute the administration of justice or
5
to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute."
The first item of alleged misconduct was a civil contempt
charge against the respondent for failure to pay alimony and child
support. The court held that the contempt order could not be the
basis for a disciplinary proceeding because "[i]t carried, per se,
no connotation of moral dereliction."' The court did, however,
find substance in the second charge, misappropriation of funds.
For this misconduct the court indefinitely suspended the respondent.
Since the respondent was under a civil contempt order and
thus subject to arrest in South Carolina, he argued that the committee's failure to establish procedures under which he could personally appear in his defense constituted a fundamental injustice.
Although recognizing this problem, the court refused to invalidate the panel's finding of facts because it was "convinced" that
even if the respondent had been present, the panel's findings
would have been the same.
Also rejected was the respondent's contention that the court
and the Board should have refrained from adjudicating the case
1. 258 S.C. 330, 188 S.E.2d 472 (1972).

2. Hereinafter designated "the Board."
3. 259 S.C. 234, 191 S.E.2d 250 (1972).
4. 258 S.C. 408, 189 S.E.2d 12 (1972).
5. Id. at 409, 189 S.E.2d at 13.

6. Id. at 412, 189 S.E.2d at 14.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1973

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 12

19731

MISCELLANEOUS

because the court in Mixson v. Mixson7 had determined that the
respondent was in contempt of the Richland County Court.
Since, according to the court, the contempt order was not a valid
basis for disciplinary proceedings, the court rejected the respondent's contention that it should disqualify itself from the case.
In In re Sampson8 the Board's recommendation that the respondent be publicly reprimanded was rejected. Although the
respondent was initially charged with eight instances of misconduct, the court found her guilty of only two: charging an excessive
fee and "improperly interven[ing] between a fellow attorney and
his client."9 Emphasizing that the objective of disciplining attorneys is "the protection of the courts and the public," the court
thoroughly examined the respondent's background and conduct.
In particular, the court considered a disorderly conduct conviction, resisting arrest conviction, and the mishandling of a probate
case. After reviewing these improprieties, the court stated that
"[m]ore was involved than an isolated incident of impropriety
or bad judgment"1' and thus ordered indefinite suspension.
II.

ELECTIONS AND VOTING

The scope and functioning of South Carolina's voting and
election laws came into question in Vandross v. Ellisor," State ex
rel. McLeod v. Ellisor,'2 and Brisben v. Thornton.3
In Vandross, the federal district court held it had no jurisdiction under section 198311 to grant relief to the plaintiff who complained he had been deprived of his right to run for the South
Carolina Senate. Vandross alleged that the defendant, the direc-

tor of the South Carolina State Election Commission, refused to
accept his filing of candidacy and to certify him to the Democratic Party. The defendant contended that he refused to certify
Vandross because he failed to file by the required deadline.
The court held that the right to run for state office arises
from the individual's relationship with his state. Citing Snowden
7. 253 S.C. 436, 171 S.E.2d 581 (1969).
8. 259 S.C. 471, 192 S.E.2d 859 (1972).
9. Id. at 473, 192 S.E.2d at 860.
10. Id. at 476, 192 S.E.2d at 862.
11. 347 F. Supp. 197 (D.S.C. 1972). See also Survey of Practice and Procedure infra.
12. 259 S.C. 364, 192 S.E.2d 188 (1972).
13. 258 S.C. 524, 189 S.E.2d 827 (1972).

14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section provides "redress" for violation of
constitutional rights under color of law.
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v. Hughes,'" the court held that the right in question was not
"federally protected or guaranteed." Since the right in question
did not fall within the ambit of those amenable to section 1983
protection, the deprivation was not one for which the court could
grant relief.
Though convinced that no jurisdiction existed, Judge
Hemphill discussed the case on the merits in the event there was
an appellate determination that jurisdiction did exist. The court
found that the defendant Ellisor refused to accept and certify the
plaintiff's filing solely because the plaintiff was not present to file
until several minutes after the filing deadline. After determining
that "Vandross, not the defendants, [was] responsible for the
dilemma in which he [found] himself,"' 6 the court found it unnecessary to invoke the holding of some cases "that where there
are special circumstances or a special showing of excuse, a declaration of candidacy which is filed too late may be accepted never18
theless."17 The relief sought was therefore denied by the court.
In State ex rel. McLeod v. Ellisor,8 . 1 the South Carolina
Supreme Court was called upon to interpret and define a new
provision 9 of South Carolina absentee balloting laws. The issue
was whether the new provision extending the right to vote by
absentee ballot to those "physically unable to present" themselves to vote should properly be read as extending the right only
to those physically unable because of a medical infirmity, or
should be read as extending the right also to those unable to
present themselves because of absence from the state. The court
determined that the act extended the right only to those whose
disability resulted from some medical problem. The court based
its determination on dictionary definitions of the words and upon
consideration of statutory provisions under which classes of people are allowed to vote by absentee ballot even though they are
merely "absent." ' 0 The court decided that the new act should be
given a limited meaning because the privilege extended to those
designated classes of voters would be rendered nugatory by the
15. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
16. 347 F. Supp. at 208.
17. Id. at 207, citing State ex rel. Huse v. Haden, 349 Mo. 982, 163 S.W.2d 946 (1942).
18. The court did, however, order the return of a $250.00 filing fee which had been
paid by Mr. Vandross in connection with his attempt to run for the State Senate.
18.1. 259 S.C. 364, 192 S.E.2d 188 (1972).
19. No. 1574, [19721 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3087.
20. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-442 (1962) and S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-449.31 (Cum.
Supp. 1971).
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broader reading of the new act and because the old provisions
should not be read as impliedly repealed.
The incorporation election of the City of North Charleston
raised procedural issues in Brisben v. Thornton.2° ' The South
Carolina Constitution requires that the incorporation of a municipality be approved by a majority of those "residing and entitled
by law to vote within the district proposed to be incorporated. ' 21
This constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean that
"only registered electors actually residing within the limits of the
proposed city or town are eligible to vote in an incorporation
election ' 2 2 and that "a majority of all qualified electors actually
' 23
residing within the proposed area is required.
Subsequent to the North Charleston election,the commission
in charge of the election revised the list of registered voters supplied by the State Election Commission. The local commission
struck from the list the names of those who had not voted and
who had not been eligible to vote in the incorporation election.
After striking these names, the revised rolls listed 5,167 eligible
electors of whom 2,627 had voted in favor of incorporation and
1,137 in opposition. These figures were certified to the Secretary
of State and application for a municipal charter was made.
The plaintiffs contended that the list of voters furnished by
the State Election Commission was binding on the local commission and, alternatively, that the commission could not revise the
list after the election. Making no distinction between revision
before or after the election, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contentions on the grounds that the list supplied by the State Election Commission was comprised of all voters registered to vote in
the area, whereas, as noted before, the South Carolina Constitution limits the class eligible to vote in incorporation elections to
those registered voters who actually reside in the area to be incorporated. Thus, the court reasoned that the list "was not conclusive as to the number of electors residing and entitled to vote
within the proposed district to be incorporated" 24 and that the
local commission was obligated to revise the list in order that the
election conform to the state constitutional requirements. The
20.1. 258 S.C. 524, 189 S.E.2d 827 (1972).
21. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
22. 258 S.C. at 527, 189 S.E.2d at 828.
23. Id. at 527-28, 189 S.E.2d at 828.
24. Id. at 531, 189 S.E.2d at 830.
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court, therefore, refused to enjoin the Secretary of State from
issuing the municipal charter.

HI.

THE MILITARY

The federal district court was faced with intricate jurisdictional issues in Parrish v. Seamans.25 The plaintiff Parrish, a
former Colonel in the United States Air Force, had been convicted in a general court martial for violations of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. Pursuant to his sentence, Parrish served
a one year term of confinement and was discharged from the Air
Force in 1956. On appeal to the Air Force Board for Correction of
Military Records, his records were changed to show an honorable
discharge. This change was made under the authority of title 10,
section 1552(a) of the United States Code, which provides:
The Secretary of a military department . . . may . . . correct
any military record of that department when he considers it
necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice . . . .Except when procured by fraud, a correction under this section
is
2
final and conclusive on all officers of the United States. G
Parrish in this suit asserted that the 1955 conviction and
resulting discharge were in violation of his constitutional rights
and consequently were void. He also sought a writ of mandamus
ordering the restoration of all benefits that "he would have received from the date of his unlawful discharge until the date he
would have retired, and all entitlements and privileges forfeited
' '2
by him as a result of his conviction.
The central issue was whether article 76 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice precluded the district court from exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. Under that article, military judicial
proceedings are generally not reviewable by civilian courts. The
plaintiff argued, however, that section 1552 created an exception
to the general rule of non-reviewability. Even though the court
agreed that certain cases28 recognized the section 1552 exception,
25.
26.
27.
28.

343 F. Supp. 1087 (D.S.C. 1972).
10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1970).
343 F. Supp. at 1089.
The court quoted from Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965), which

had held that since Congress, when it gave the secretaries of the military departments the
authority to review courts-martial, had specifically deleted from the proposed legislation
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it refused to follow the reasoning of those cases. The court thought
to do so would be to nullify the provisions of finality contained
in article 76 which the court considered essential to the scheme
of military justice created by Congress.
The court also considered whether the remedy requested, a
writ of mandamus, was appropriate. Noting that the plaintiff
sought the nullification of his discharge even though he had already obtained an alteration of his records to show an honorable
discharge, the court characterized the plaintiff's action as primarily a "claim for a money judgment against the United
29
States."2
Citing Carter v. Seamans,31 the court held that under the
applicable statute 3' it had no jurisdiction over claims against the
United States in excess of $10,000.00. In light of the period of time
involved, the court was convinced that the plaintiff's claim would
exceed that amount. Therefore the court held that the suit should
have been filed in the United States Court of Claims which has
jurisdiction over claims against the United States in excess of
$10,000.00.32
Independent of the jurisdictional issues, the court held that
mandamus would be an improper remedy. Stating that
"[miandamus is an extraordinary remedy which is availale only
in cases in which the usual forms of procedure are powerless to
afford relief,133 the court held that it would be inappropriate to
issue a writ because the court of claims could resolve all issues,
including the constitutionality of plaintiff's conviction and discharge.
In Drummond v. Froehlke,3 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Army had not failed to follow its own regulations in discharging the plaintiff and upheld the plaintiff's undesirable discharge.
provisions which would have precluded review of the secretary's action, Congress intended
to create an exception to the non-reviewability of military judicial proceedings. The court
cited as following the Ashe rule: Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1968) and
United States v. Augenblich, 377 F.2d 586 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The court distinguished Smith
and Ashe on the grounds that the plaintiff sought to completely void his discharge,
whereas in those cases the plaintiffs had sought only a change in the types of discharge.
29. 343 F. Supp. at 1093.
30. 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
33. 343 F. Supp. at 1094.
34. 460 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1972).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss3/12

6

McMurray: Miscellaneous
422

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvmiw

[Vol. 25

Army regulation 635-208 requires that to be discharged under
nonhonorable conditions an individual must be certified as mentally competent and physically sound. If no certification can be
made, alternative procedures possibly leading to an honorable
medical discharge are to be invoked.
The plaintiff had been certified as having "no disqualifying
mental or physical defects.13 1 The certification also contained a
psychiatrist's recommendation that plaintiff be given a discharge
for unsuitability under honorable conditions. The lower court had
found that in light of the psychiatrist's recommendation the
Army should have invoked the alternative procedure required by
regulation 635-208.
Terming the psychiatrist's recommendation "gratuitous,"
the court held that the Army's failure to proceed under the alternative procedures did not violate its own requirements since the
certification required by regulation 635-208 had been made.
IV.

CORPORATIONS

The nature of the fiduciary duty owed by corporate directors
and officers to stockholders was further explained by the South
3
Carolina Supreme Court in Talbot v. James. 1
Chicora Apartments, Inc., was a closely held corporation organized specifically to build and operate apartments. Of the
twenty shares of stock issued, James, the defendant, owned ten,
and Mr. and Mrs. Talbot, the plaintiffs, owned ten. James was
the president and a director of the corporation while Talbot was
vice-president and a director.
The controversy centered on a contract for the construction
of the apartments executed by James in two capacities-one, as
president of Chicora Apartments, Inc., and the other, as the sole
proprietor of the James Construction Company. The plaintiffs
brought this suit for an accounting, claiming that James had
breached his fiduciary duty by failing to disclose the nature of the
contract. The plaintiffs claimed that in so doing James was able
to appropriate to his personal use some $25,025.31, which had
been obtained for the construction of the apartments.
James asserted that his dual interest in the contract had
been revealed to the Talbots and that he was entitled to the sums
35. Id. at 266.
36. 259 S.C. 73, 190 S.E.2d 759 (1972).
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received as payment for general overhead expenses on the construction contract.
The court examined the preincorporation and incorporation
agreements to ascertain the obligations and rights of the parties.
It noted specifically that under both agreements the plaintiffs'
only obligation was to convey the land to the corporation. James,
on the other hand, was obligated under the preincorporation
agreement "[t]o promote the project . . . and . . . be responsible for the planning, architectural work, construction, landscaping, legal fees, and loan processing of the entire project. ' 37 He
was "authorized, empowered and directed to make . . . documents and instruments . . . including . . . [a] Construction
Contract."3 The contract entitled James to a $20,000.00 "fee" in
addition to the construction cost. Also, an itemization of the expenses of the construction indicated that $31,589.00 of the price
39
was allocated to general overhead expenses.
The issues were whether James had disclosed the facts of his
dual capacity in executing the contract, whether he had disclosed
the details of the contract, and whether, if these disclosures were
not made, James had breached his fiduciary duty.
On the question of disclosure of dual capacity the court determined that James had entered the contract without disclosing
his conflicting interests. However, even if the defendant had
made this disclosure, the court held that his failure to disclose the
details of the contract, which was personally beneficial to him,
was still a breach of his fiduciary duty. In making this determination the court relied on Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary" which held
that, when an officer contracts with his corporation in his personal capacity, the transaction is voidable at the option of the
corporation. 4'
Additionally, the court cited Gilbert for the principle that
even if the officer does not act in his official capacity the transac37. Id. at 78, 190 S.E.2d at 761.
38. Id. at 80, 190 S.E.2d at 763.
39. The full contract price was to be $736,000.00.
40. 219 S.C. 174, 64 S.E.2d 524 (1951).
41. It must be noted that this case today would be controlled by S.C. CODE ANN. § 1218.16(a) (Cum. Supp. 1971). This statute did not become effective until January 1, 1964,
whereas the contract in question was executed on November 6, 1963. Under the statute,
even if disclosure were not made, the contract would be voidable only if the defendant
could not show that it was "fair and equitable" when made.
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tion will be voidable if the director has not made full disclosure,
paid full value, or if the corporation has been imposed upon.42
Under these standards the court thought that James had violated
his duty, thus entitling the corporation to recover the funds which
James had diverted to his own use. A factor important to the
court was that under the preincorporation agreement James was
obligated to perform the services for which he now claimed compensation. Additionally, the court noted that under the preincorporation agreement James had not been authorized to contract with himself personally.
Justices Bussey and Brailsford disagreed with the majority's
view of the facts. They thought that on the date of the contract
the plaintiffs knew "James Construction Company was going to
be the general contractor on the project,

'43

and that "any lack of

knowledge" of the details of the contract on Talbot's part was due
to his "lack of diligence or interest and not to any intentional
failure to disclose by James." 44 Under this view the dissenters
thought that the contract was not voidable at the option of the
corporation.
According to the dissenters, James was not obligated by the
preincorporation agreement to perform the service of a general
contractor. Thus, they thought that even if the contract were
voidable James would be entitled to compensation for his costs,
including the general overhead expense, and thus would be liable
to the corporation only for his personal profits.
In United States v. Theodore5 the South Carolina federal
district court held"8 that a partnership which holds itself out as a
corporation can not, when sued in its corporate capacity, "change
[its] proverbial hat" in order to assert rights available to a partnership but not available to a corporation. The court rejected the
respondent's argument that under South Carolina law the sole
method of deciding whether a business entity is a professional
association is by determining whether the entity filed the required agreements.4"
42. 259 S.C. at 83, 190 S.E.2d at 764, citing Gilbert v. McLeod Infirmary, 219 S.C.
174, 64 S.E.2d 524 (1951).
43. Id. at 91, 190 S.E.2d at 768.
44. Id.
45. 347 F. Supp. 1070 (D.S.C. 1972).
46. See also Survey of Taxation infra.
47. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1604 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
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Citing Darganv. Graves," which held that a business entity
that had obtained a corporate charter but had failed to complete
incorporation was bound by its representation that it was in fact
a corporation, the court held that South Carolina still recognizes
incorporation by estoppel. On this theory the court determined
that the respondent could be compelled to submit the corporate
records which the respondent had withheld on the grounds that
as a partner in a partnership he could assert his right against
self-incrimination.
The court also stated that even if it were true that the respondents could not be sued as a corporation, under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure49 they could still be reached in their
business capacity and consequently could not assert rights personal to themselves in favor of the partnership.
V.

ANTITRUST

In Kendall Elevator Co. v. LBC&W Associates,-" the defendant's architect had included in a client's construction plans a
restriction that elevators could not be supplied by anyone who
was not "the manufacturer of the major components" 51 of the
elevators, and a specification that the elevators must be manufactured by the Otis Elevator Company, or of equal quality. According to the United States District Court, District of South
Carolina, since these specifications were not intended to create a
monopoly or to restrain trade, the defendant had not violated
5
federal antitrust laws. 1
The court thought that architects should properly consider
the convenience of service and of maintenance as well as other
advantages gained by dealing with the manufacturers. Based on
this reasoning, the court believed the architect was completely
justified in recommending to his clients that the suppliers of elevators be restricted to manufacturers of major components. The
court further recognized that the restriction, which excluded the
plaintiff from dealing with the architect's clients, was not unlawful unless the defendant had violated title 15, section 1, of the
United States Code. Section 1 states that a necessary element
48.
49.
50.
51.

252 S.C. 641, 168 S.E.2d 306 (1969).
FED. R. Crv. P. 17(b).
350 F. Supp. 75 (D.S.C. 1972).
Id. at 76.
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of an antitrust violation is an agreement or "joint action." The
court noted the plaintiff had conceded that he had no prospect
of proving the existence of such an agreement. As to the second
restriction, the court determined that Otis' name was used not to
limit the class of elevators to those manufactured by Otis, but
only to set a standard of quality.
VI.

SEX DISCRIMINATION

In Eslinger v. Thomas, 3 Eslinger, a student at the University
of South Carolina Law School, alleged that she had been denied
employment as a page in the South Carolina State Senate "solely
because of her sex." Because "the defendants had shown no justifiable reason"- 4 for this refusal the court had no difficulty finding
a denial of Eslinger's constitutional rights. The court, however,
refused to levy damages against defendant Thomas, the Clerk of
the Senate. Following Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,5" the court held that since Thomas' refusal to hire
Eslinger was "in good faith" and did not deprive her of a constitutional right previously clearly recognized, it should not impose
money damages which otherwise would be recoverable under title
42, section 1983 of the United States Code.
Subsequent to the institution of this suit the Senate adopted
a resolution56 which permitted the hiring of part-time female
employees; however, the resolution prohibited these employees
from performing personal errands for the senators. Eslinger also
challenged the constitutionality of the discrimination engendered
7 which
in this resolution. The court, citing Williams v. McNair,5
held that discrimination is permissible as long as it is not arbitrary and is rationally justified, found that "the constitutional
rights of female citizens are not unduly restricted or violated""8
by the resolution."
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
340 F. Supp. 886 (D.S.C. 1972).
Id. at 894.
309 F. Supp. 184 (D.S.C. 1970).
S.C. Senate Resolution 525 (1971).
316 F. Supp, 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
340 F. Supp. at 894.
Other than recognizing the "real physical differences" between men and women

the court did not discuss or suggest the rational justification behind the discrimination.
Presumably, the justification is that the discrimination is to protect the reputations of
both Senators and part-time female employees.
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The court refused to invoke the more recent equal protection
test which would have required the Senate to justify its discriminatory practices as necessary for the furtherance of a compelling
state interest. The court held that invocation of the more rigid
test is proper only where discrimination is based on race or where
the "classifications and restrictions . . . serve to penalize or restrict the exercise of some constitutionally protected right."6 The
court said that sex discrimination, unlike racial discrimination,
"is not patently unlawful or unconstitutional.""
VII.

SECURITIES REGULATION

The main issue in MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. American
Barmag Corp.62 was whether bills of exchange fall within the definition of "securities" 63 as used in title 15, sections 77(a) et seq.,
of the United States Code. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant by fraud and misrepresentation obtained certain bills of
exchange as partial payment for machinery which plaintiff had
purchased from the defendant on the inducement of defendant's
fraudulent statements. The court, recognizing previous rulings,64
determined that the term "security" should be broadly interpreted and held that the bills of exchange are "sufficiently within
the definition of 'security'.""
VfII.

PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF INCOMPETENTS

In ClarendonHolding Co. v. Witherspoon6 the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to authorize the sale of the property
of the defendant, a person non compos mentis. Plaintiff sued to
quiet title to certain property conveyed to it by the defendant.
The defendant's guardian ad litem countered asking for a declaration that his ward owned the property. The guardian asserted
that the conveyance was made under an invalid court order which
60. 340 F. Supp. at 896.
61. Id.
62. 339 F. Supp. 1401 (D.S.C. 1972).
63. Under 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), as the court points out, the definition of "security" is very broad indeed. It speaks specifically of the various forms of securities and
generally of "any evidence of indebtedness" as well as of "any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security'."
64. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
65. 339 F. Supp. at 1406.
66. 258 S.C. 296, 188 S.E.2d 480 (1972).
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issued from proceedings in which Elkins, the defendant's committee, had taken no action to protect the defendant's interest.
In light of Elkins' testimony that he had failed to consider the
defendant's best interest in the sale and that he was not even
"aware" that he had petitioned for the sale, the court concluded
that the ward owned the property because he had not been adequately represented at the prior sale. The court based its holding
on Simpson v. Doggett," which held that a guardian's failure to
diligently prosecute the rights of his ward would not only result
in liability against the guardian but also void a judgment obtained in violation of this duty. The court held that the committee was subject to the same duties as a guardian ad litem and that
because of his failure to protect the rights of the incompetent it
was the court's duty to void the proceedings.
IX.

PATENT INFRINGEMENT

A major problem in patent infringement cases is their technical subject matter. Maschinenfabrik Rieter A.G. v. Greenwood
Mills"8 is no exception. It concerned a textile system designed to
transport ginned, cleaned, and opened cotton to carding machines for further processing. In 1962 a patent under the title
"Automatic Carding Plant" was issued for the Rieter system.
After public display of the Rieter system, Continental/Moss
Gordon, Inc., pursuant to Greenwood Mills' request, developed
and supplied to Greenwood Mills a system for feeding cotton to
the card machine. The Continental system, claimed the plaintiff,
infringed on the patent of the Rieter system.
Continental maintained that no infringement existed because plaintiffs patent was invalid for failure to meet statutory
requirements. The court held that plaintiff's claim met the test
of section 1129 which requires that "the specifications and claims
[must be] sufficiently detailed to enable a man of ordinary skill
in the art to construct [the invention described in the patent]
in accordance with the teachings of the patent in suit and to
determine from the claim language the scope of the patent coverage."

70

67.
68.
69.
70.

159 S.C. 294, 156 S.E. 771 (1930).
340 F. Supp. 1103 (D.S.C. 1972).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970).
340 F. Supp. at 1109.
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The central issue was whether the invention was, at the time
it was made, obvious to a person skilled in the art to which the
invention pertained. If the invention is held obvious, it is unpatentable under section 103.71 After reviewing the facts at length,
the court concluded that the innovations of the Rieter system
were not obvious and therefore patentable.
The court analyzed in depth the question of obviousness.
Specifically, it rejected the defendant's approach which based its
view of prior art on selected aspects of prior patents. The court
cited several cases 72 which held that the necessity of relying on
such an approach in itself indicates that the invention was not
obvious. The extreme age of these prior patents, noted the court,
indicated their irrelevance and perhaps even the non-obviousness
of the plaintiff's invention.
One prior patent was used as a reference point by the Patent
Office in researching for the Rieter patent. The court considered
it particularly significant that the similarities between plaintiffs
patent and the older patent had been carefully weighed by the
Patent Office.
With respect to those patents presented by the defendant but
omitted in the Patent Office's research record, the court felt that
the absence of notation did not necessarily indicate they had been
disregarded.
"Secondary" factors7 3 according to the court, also bear on
the issue of obviousness. Such factors are "commercial success,
long felt but unsolved problems, and the attempts and failures of
others to solve such problems.

'74

Under this approach the court

reasoned that the facts indicated non-obviousness. The court
emphasized that Continental had in fact duplicated the plaintiff's system after its success. The court considered this a strong
indication that the imitator thought the system innovative.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). Section 103 states:
A patent may not be obtained. . . .if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
72. Reynolds v. Whitin Mach. Works, 167 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 844 (1948); Adams v. United States, 330 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl. 1964), afl'd, 383 U.S. 39
(1966).
73. These factors are enumerated in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
74. 340 F. Supp. at 1115.
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Finally, the defendant argued that its system did not infringe
on Rieter's patent because it was substantially different. On this
point, the court stated: "[Olne does not avoid infringement by
following the teachings of a patent imperfectly or by constructing
a device that does not function as well as the patented structure,
so long as he appropriates the substance of the invention."7 Having concluded that the Continental system was substantially
identical to the Rieter system, the court upheld the validity of the
plaintiff's patent and held the defendant liable for infringement.
In a second case, Sabel v. Wickes Corp.,7" the court held the
plaintiff's patent invalid on the grounds of obviousness. The
plaintiff's invention was an ornamental column fabricated by die
7
stamping sheet metal and welding the sheets to a metal frame. 1
Previously, the columns had been fabricated from either
wrought or cast iron, both of which were inferior materials. The
court found that the innovations were obvious. 78 Noting that the
commercial success of the columns was the result of using sheet
metal, the court held that according to accepted law "the substi'79
tution of one material for another is not patentable.
The presumption of validity of an issued patent was also
recognized, but it was determined that "the presumption is weakened because of the failure of the patent examiner to properly
consider the pertinent prior art."80
X.

UNFAIR COMPETITION

In Columbia BroadcastingSystem v. Custom Recording
Co.," Columbia Broadcasting System s' requested injunctive relief
to prevent the defendant from re-recording its publicly marketed
phonographic records and selling the copies in competition with
C.B.S. The defendant asserted that having purchased copies of
the plaintiff's records he could make any use of them that he
75. 340 F. Supp. at 1119, quoting Matthews v. Allen, 182 F.2d 824, 828 (4th Cir. 1950).
76. 345 F. Supp. 1227 (D.S.C. 1971).
77. This statement is considerably over-simplified.
78. The court cited Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), for the proposition
that the state of the art prior to the invention determines whether it is obvious.
79. 345 F. Supp. at 1229.
80. Id.
81. 258 S.C. 465, 189 S.E.2d 305 (1972).
82. Hereinafter, "C.B.S."
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wished. He based this contention on a South Carolina statute8 3
which specifically abolished any right the original might have had
at common law.
On appeal, the court phrased the issue: "Did the actions of
the defendant amount to such a breach as to entitle plaintiff to
injunctive relief?"84 More precisely, the issue is: Does the plaintiff
have a legal right to insist its records not be re-recorded and sold
by someone else?
The court discussed InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,5 which disregarded the property aspects of misappropriation of unpatented, uncopyrighted intangible creations
and emphasized the unfairness of allowing a competitor to appropriate the creator's work product without recompense. That case
recognized the appropriateness of injunctive relief n such situations. However, the court recognized that Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co.86 and Compco Corp. v. Daybright Lighting, Inc.,"
which held "that a state law of unfair competition cannot impose
liability for the copying of an article which was not protected by
either a federal patent or copyright," 8 put considerable strain on
the older Associated Press theory. The court resolved this apparent dichotomy by distinguishing between the copying involved in
the Sears and Compco cases and actually "appropriating the performance" by recording it.8s
The court found persuasive Liberty/UA, Inc. v. EasternTape
83. S.C.

CODE ANN. § 66-101 (1962) states:
When any phonograph record or electrical transcription, upon which musical
performances are embodied, is sold in commerce for use within this State, all
asserted common-law rights further to restrict or collect royalties on the commercial use made of any such recorded performances by any person are abrogated and expressly repealed. When such article or chattel has been sold in
commerce any asserted intangible rights shall be deemed to have passed to the
purchaser upon the purchase of the chattel itself and the right to further restrict
the use made of phonograph records or electrical transcriptions, whose sole value
is in their use, is forbidden and abrogated. Nothing in this section shall be
deemed to deny the rights granted any person by the United States copyright
laws. The sole intendment of this section is to abolish any common-law rights
attaching to phonograph records and electrical transcriptions, whose sole value
is in their use, and to forbid further restrictions or the collection of subsequent
fees and royalties on phonograph records and electrical transcriptions by performers who were paid for the initial performance at the recording thereof.
84. 258 S.C. at 472, 189 S.E.2d at 308.
85. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
86. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
87. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
88. 258 S.C. at 473, 189 S.E.2d at 309.
89. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App.2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970), among
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss3/12
other cases, was cited by the court for this proposition.
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Corp.," a North Carolina case which involved a statute identical
to the South Carolina statute. The court adopted the reasoning
in Liberty that the statute, enacted in 1939 when the legislature
could not have envisioned the technology which makes this type
of dispute possible, should be construed as applicable only when
the record is actually played to a listener and not when it is rerecorded. The court held that "[tihe parasitic acts of defendants
violated plaintiff's legal rights. Injunctive relief should have been
granted to protect those rights." 9 '
Justice Bussey in the dissent objected to deciding the substantive issues on an appeal from denial of a temporary injunction. He considered this improper because it denied the court the
assistance and benefits normally incident to an adjudication by
the court. He also maintained that granting a temporary injunction is a decision for the lower court, especially when plaintiff
seeks legal redress and injunctive relief and there is no impediment to the vindication of the plaintiff's legal rights.
In Future Plastics,Inc. v. Ware Shoals Plastics,Inc. ,92 one
of two cases involving allegedly misappropriated trade secrets,
the secrets were the methods and machinery by which high molecular weight plastics could be manufactured through the use of
a "ram extrusion" process. Future Plastics was founded in 1960
by Coyt Murray and others to exploit certain inventions made by
Murray. After incorporation it developed the processes now in
issue. The defendant Massey, accused of conveying the secrets to
the defendant corporation, went to work for Future in 1962. In his
employment he learned the processes and in fact constructed
several of the machines plaintiff used in connection with them.
In 1964, Murray asked Massey and other employees to sign covenants not to compete and agreements binding themselves to secrecy. Massey refused to sign. In 1965 Murray released several
employees from their covenants and binders. Until 1965 stringent
efforts were made to protect the secrets, but in that year
Murray founded Impact Plastics and disposed of his interest in
Future. Impact utilized the procedures to compete with Future,
but Future failed to prevent their use or to bind Impact to se90. 11 N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414 (1971).
91. 258 S.C. at 478, 189 S.E.2d at 312.
92. 340 F. Supp. 1376 (D.S.C. 1972).
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crecy. Subsequent to Murray's departure from Future, the company was beset by problems, and Massey began planning 3 to
leave Future and set up his own business to compete with Impact
and Future. In 1966, Future's stockholders, agreeing not to compete until 1971, sold the company to Impact Plastics. Murray,
once again in charge of Future, requested Massey to bind himself
to secrecy and non-competition. Massey refused and left Future.
Prior to leaving Future, Massey and others founded Ware Shoals
Plastics, which utilized the process.
In 1967 representatives of Future made statements to law
officers and others accusing Massey of misappropriating Future's
secrets and stealing its equipment. Future then brought this action to recover damages and to enjoin Ware Shoals Plastics from
further utilizing its trade secrets. The defendants counterclaimed, charging slander and legal harassment intended to eliminate competition. The defendants asserted that the processes
were common knowledge in the plastics industry and that Massey
had never been bound to secrecy. The court found specifically
that, because of Future's failure to maintain secrecy, by 1966 the
process could no longer be considered secret. The court, however,
reached its holding in part on other grounds.
Future claimed that, because its business began as a joint
venture between Murray and others, Murray had a right to use
the processes. Therefore, reasoned Future, by allowing Impact to
utilize the processes, it was not relaxing its secrecy. The court
rejected this contention because Future's corporate status completely negated the existence of a joint venture. Thus, the court
held that Future's acquiescence in Impact's use of its secrets was
a breach of the duty to maintain secrecy which must be discharged if the misappropriation of trade secrets is asserted as the
basis of legal action.94
Secondly, the court stated that Massey could not be charged
with misappropriation because he was not bound to maintain
secrecy. The court determined that in the absence of an express
agreement to the contrary, "an employee after leaving the service
of his employer may carry on the same business and use for his
own benefit the things he has learned in his prior employment."9 5
93. On his own time, the court found.
94. J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murray & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 260
N.E.2d 723 (1970), was cited by the court for this rule.
95. 340 F. Supp. at 1384.
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The court also recognized that an injunction would be improper because "he who seeks equity must do equity and he must
come into court with clean hands."98 Noting that Future Plastics
was wholly owned by Impact, which "was conceived in the same
sin of which it now accuses the defendants,"9 the court denied
the plaintiff relief.
The court dismissed defendant's slander counterclaim because he had failed to show damages, and the harassment element of the counterclaim was also dismissed because the suit had
been brought in good faith.
In Lowndes Products, Inc. v. Brower,9" the plaintiff brought
suit alleging that former employees had wrongfully appropriated
its trade secrets, which consisted of processes, formulas, and
machinery used in manufacturing non-woven textiles. As a second ground of recovery, the plaintiff alleged that certain defendants, while still employed, had breached their duty of fidelity.
Relying on the Restatement of Torts99 and Callmann's treatise on unfair competition,' 9 the court determined that the technology involved constituted trade secrets.
On the issue of secrecy the court noted Lowndes' actions,
including "instances where actual or potential competitors were
given tours of Lowndes' facilities."'0 1 Finding that Lowndes had
"failed to take the precautionary measures necessary to protect
its techniques,' ' 0 the court denied the plaintiff relief.
As to plaintiff's breach of loyalty charge, the court determined that two of the ex-employees while employed by the plaintiff had violated the duty.0 3 The court granted plaintiff a recovery
of damages sustained as a result of the defendant employees'
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
99. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 757, comment b, at 5 (1939).
100. 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 52 et seq. (3d ed. 1968).
101. 259 S.C. at 330, 191 S.E.2d at 766.
102. Id. at 331, 191 S.E.2d at 766.
103. Brower, while a plant manager, had failed to notify his employers that key
employees were planning to leave. He had in fact encouraged them to leave and to keep
their plans secret.
Loftin, another former employee, deprived the plaintiff of a valuable sales relationship. He also entered into an agreement with a customer to organize a corporation to
compete with the plaintiff.
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breaches of duty. The court adopted the view"0 4 that the principal
can recover not only for the damages caused by the breach of duty
but also the benefits wrongfully appropriated by the agent. The
court also reasoned that third parties who knowingly induce or
make possible breaches of the agent's duty are also liable to the
principal.0 5 The court therefore held that the other defendants
should be held jointly liable with the two disloyal employees. As
the beneficiary of the breaches of fidelity, the corporation formed
to compete with the plaintiff was also held liable.
D. LAIRD McMURRAY
104. 3 AM. JuR. 2d Agency §§ 220, 223 (1962).
105. 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 290 (1962).
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